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CAUGHT IN THE WEB
Introduction
In September 1995, the Federal Bureau of Investigation made
its first nationwide sweep to catch pedophiles who misuse computer
networks to solicit sex from minors and transmit illegal pornographic
material.' Conducted with search warrants and the permission of
America Online (AOL), the two year investigation resulted in 15
arrests and the seizure of 125 suspects' computers and diskettes.2
Agents gathered evidence undercover by posing while "on-line" as
underage potential victims and pedophiles,' by monitoring private e-
mail and private "chats," or conversations, using AOL services.4
Encouraged by the success of this operation, federal law enforcement
authorities have indicated plans to use similar surveillance techniques
to fight other computer-related crimes including consumer fraud,
money laundering, and stolen credit card rings.5
Since the 1970's, undercover investigations have resulted in an
increase in prosecutions in the area of child pornography at both the
state and federal levels.6 Law enforcement has used extremely creative
methods, putting the government in the position of seemingly being
one of the major marketing forces of child pornography in the United
1. Michele Quinn, FBI Raids Hit Child Cyberporn, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 14, 1995, at Al.
America Online has 3.5 million subscribers nationwide and was America's largest computer
network in 1995. Id. Federal and local law enforcement agencies had been using similar
techniques since 1993 to conduct investigations on amateur electronic bulletin boards where
computer criminals traffic in stolen information, child pornography, poison recipes, and bomb
making instructions. Ralph Blumenthal, Cyber Cop Patrols Computer Underworld, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 7, 1993, at 4. Previously, in 1993, a federal investigation, "Operation Long Arm," targeted
child-porn rings on amateur bulletin boards. For a description of bulletin board services, see infra
Part II.A.2. 40 Computerized Child Porn Locations Raided, One in County, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Mar. 5, 1993, at A8.
2. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Undercover on the Dark Side of Cyberspace; Online FBI Agents
Troll for those Who Prey on Children but Cybercops Tactics Chill Critics, WASH. POST, Jan. 2,
1996, at D1. AOL was first alerted to the online distribution of child pornography by subscribers
who forwarded examples of the distributed material to the company. After determining the
material was illegal, AOL sent out warnings to users and contacted law enforcement. Quinn,
supra note 1, at Al.
3. In the context of this Note, the term "pedophile" refers to individuals in search of either
child pornography or minors to recruit for sex.
4. Bruce Selcraig, Chasing Computer Perverts, PENTHOUSE, Feb. 1996, at 47, 48.
5. Steven Labaton, As Pornography Arrests Grow, So Do Plans for Computer Stings, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al. A discussion of other consensual and conspiratorial computer-
related crimes is beyond the scope of this Note. For further information regarding computer-
related crimes, see generally Adam Ciongoli, Computer Related Crimes, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 425
(1994); Scott Charney, Computer Crime, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 489 (1994).
6. Jack B. Harrison, Case Note, The Government as Pornographer: Government Sting
Operations and Entrapment, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1993).
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States. 7 The undercover policing of child pornography distribution and
related crimes in "cyberspace" 8 creates the potential for new levels of
police deception and creativity, and heightens the potential for abuse.
This Note focuses on the difficulties of applying existing
entrapment doctrine, currently the chief limitation on police
deception, to computer sting operations. The following analysis
suggests that different settings for undercover police operations merit
different levels of protection. Specifically, the unique characteristics of
cyberspace warrant greater protection and vigilance against abuse
than other "real world" settings. This Note concludes that either the
legislature or the appropriate law enforcement agencies must create
guidelines for controlling undercover policing in this new forum,
rather than continuing to rely on the judicially created entrapment
doctrine.
Part I introduces the problem of online child pornography
distribution and child sex solicitation, and details of how law
enforcement agencies have responded to these problems. Part II
provides an overview of the terms and definitions of the various levels
of interaction in cyberspace. This section also examines the unique
attributes making crime detection difficult in this setting. Part III
summarizes the decisional developments of entrapment law at the
federal and state levels, examining tensions between the various
purported goals and underlying policies of the entrapment tests. In
addition, Part III describes the existing legal standards for a viable
entrapment defense.
Part IV analyzes the potential application of existing entrapment
doctrine to undercover investigations in cyberspace, and the potential
consequences of such an application. Part V explores and critiques
alternative methods which have been proposed for detecting and
preventing crime in cyberspace. In conclusion, Part VI recommends
possible solutions for modifying current entrapment law to
accomodate the unique conditions of cyberspace. Additionally, Part
VI recommends that legislation is needed which recognizes cyberspace
7. Id. at 1068 (citing Lawrence Stanley, The Child Porn Myth, 7 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J.
269, 321-25 (1989)(describing efforts such as "creating phony businesses, newsletters, and
personae in order to encourage the purchase, sale and exchange of child
pornography ...[siting operations aimed at individuals who receive pornography, suspected
'pedophiles,' nudists, and any others assumed to be consumers or home producers of child
pornography.")).
8. For the purposes of this Note, the term "cyberspace" will be used to refer to any
interaction on computer networks.
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as a novel forum for undercover law enforcement operations. At the
present time, this forum is not adequately protected by existing
judicially developed guidelines for curtailing police deception.
I
Online Child Pornography and the
Current Response of Law Enforcement
According to the FBI, "[tihe use of online services or bulletin
board systems is rapidly becoming one of the most prevalent
techniques for individuals to share pornographic pictures of minors, as
well as to identify and recruit minors into sexually illicit
relationships."9  Computer transmissions are quickly replacing
traditional magazine formats for exchanges of child pornography
among pedophiles. 10 In 1995 there were at least five documented cases
of online child sex solicitation around the nation, none of which have
yet played out in court.11 Additionally, the National Center for
Missing Children has recorded more than one-dozen reported cases of
9. Laura Myers, FBI Raids 120 Homes, Arrests Dozens in Child-Porn Probe, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Sept. 14, 1995, at AO4. Police began discovering pedophiles using electronic
bulletin boards to exchange computerized pornography and lists of victims with other pedophiles
as early as 1988. See Vicki Torres, New Puzzle: High-Tech Pedophilia Technology: Computer
Disks Confiscated in Glendora Arrest Contain Sexually Explicit Material Involving Young Boys.
Police Say Greater Use of Such Equipment is Difficult to Track Down, L.A. TimmS, Mar. 5, 1993,
at 3. See discussion infra Part II.
10. Raids in 15 States Target Computerized Child Porn Ring, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 5,
1993, at A17 (Study by Carnegie Mellon reports growing prevalence of child pornography
online).
11. Kim Murphy, Youngsters Falling Prey to Seducers in Computer Crime Web: Once Candy
Was the Lure. Now Strangers Are Using Cyberspace E-mail to Attract Minors into Harm's Way,
L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at 1. Two online seduction cases which gained national attention
involved 13-year old Tara Noble of Kentucky (who disappeared leaving e-mail message printouts
behind from "George" in California who wrote "[w]e can run around our room naked all day and
all night"); and 15-year old Daniel Montgomery of Washington (who disappeared after being
sent a bus ticket by his seducer, a man known in AOL's subscriber directory as "Damien Starr"
who listed his hobby as engaging in fellatio and his motto as, "[t]he one who dies with the most
boys ... toys wins."). Both teens apparently corresponded with their seducers by e-mail after
meeting them through AOL. AOL initially refused to give Daniel's parents any information
about the subscriber known as "Damien," but eventually turned over all records in the Noble
and Montgomery cases to law enforcement authorities. Id. For more case references, see also
Mary Murphy, Computer Prowlers Stalk Kids Nowadays, it Seems Everything is Done by
Computer-Including Child Molestation, A Special Agent Discovers, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 9,
1995, at 1; Man Allegedly Used E-mail to Reach, then Molest Boy, SAN DIEGO UNIoN-TRam,, April
6, 1994, at A4.
19961
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
cyberspace "courting" by individuals seeking sex with minors during
the past year.
2
Computer networks provide an ideal setting for the activities of
would-be pedophiles.Y They can use computer networks to
communicate with each other, trading child pornography and sharing
the names of potential victims. 14 They can also trade referrals for
fertile cyberspace victim recruitment sites.15 With increasing numbers
of teens and children going online, cyberspace offers a plentiful source
of potential underage victims. If the first target is nonreceptive, the
seducer can quickly switch to another. 6 Further, the anonymity and
brevity of e-mail communications provide safe cover for avoiding the
detection of online contact by parents, system monitors, and law
enforcement agents. 17
Individuals seeking sex with minors typically "stake out" online
chat rooms or public bulletin boards frequented by teens on the
commercial services, such as AOL or CompuServe, or the Internet. 18
Would-be pedophiles can chat amicably in public areas until they find
a minor with whom they wish to talk with more suggestively, and
perhaps initiate a meeting. 19 The seducer then invites the minor to talk
on an unmonitored line, either in a private chat room or through
12. Computer Used to Lure Rape Victim?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 30, 1995, at As.
13. Torres, supra note 9, at 3.
14. Id. Computerized pornography is more than just crude images. Computer scanners,
sound effects, and color screens enable lifelike images, taken from photographs, to be transferred
to the computer and programmed with motion and sound into short, television-like x-rated
scenes. Interactive programs also exist where the pedophile chooses the plot line as he
progresses. Id.
15. Stephen Bates, Rule of Law: Pedophiles on the Internet: Free Speech in Cyberspace,
ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 3, 1994, at 10. For a general discussion of the various levels of
interaction in cyberspace, see infra Part II.
16. Sandra Pedicini, Vicious Practice Has Gone High-Tech, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 19,
1994, at B1. Ironically, law enforcement officials say this makes online pedophiles easy to spot
because they have to talk to many children before they "get" one. Id.; John Larrabee, Cyberspace
a New Beat for Police, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1994, at 1A ("a majority of the people online are
kids").
17. Kim Murphy, supra note 11, at 1; see also Pedicini, supra note 16, at B1. Large services
like AOL and CompuServe require identification for those who want to use their services, but
some people have managed to register with fake identification despite attempts at verification. It
can be even harder to track down users on the Internet, where there is no central control, and on
small bulletin boards run by individuals who do not require users to identify themselves. Id.
18. Kim Murphy, supra note 11; see also Pendicini, supra note 16.
19. Quinn, supra note 1; see also Mary Murphy, supra note 11; Pendicini, supra note 16.
[VCOL. 19:157
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e-mail.A2 Techniques used to lure victims include sending pictures of
himself or herself, pictures of nude children, or requesting pictures
from the underage victims. 2' The suspect may then attempt to arrange
a meeting, either by asking for sex directly or by using more deceptive
methods.' For example, the suspect may offer to teach adolescents a
specialized skill or expose them to activities to which they would not
otherwise have access.3 Many of these online criminals are quite savvy
in avoiding detection. They do not put anything in their messages
which would make them susceptible to criminal charges, but "make
things look so attractive that the kid's going to want to run away on his
own, without any soliciting."'
In order to combat these high tech pedophiles, federal and local
law enforcement agencies have responded with a number of deceptive
online undercover techniques, claiming that such practices are justified
by the difficulty of detecting crime in this anonymous setting.2S
Authorities have set up phony bulletin boards?' and may also be
running one or more of the Internet's "anonymous remailers" sites,
which strip the names and addresses of e-mail messages before
forwarding them anonymously.2
Agents have also been going undercover online to pose as
pedophiles or underage victims to catch these criminals. Their
general mission is to engage suspects in steamy conversations in the
hope of eliciting a proposition 9 In "trying to fit in with the language
and activities"' of the chatroom environment, police use suggestive
user names and profiles, and engage in raunchy online conversation.
The agents then save the text of the exchanged messages (and in some
20. Quinn, supra note 1; see also Mary Murphy, supra note 11, at 1; Pedicini, supra note 16,
at B1.
21. Pedicini, supra note 16, at B1.
22. Id., see also Kim Murphy, supra note 11, at 1.
23. Torres, supra note 9, at 3 (Psychiatrists call these "grooming techniques.").
24. Kim Murphy, supra note 11, at 1.
25. Labatron, supra note 5, at Al; see also Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D1.
26. Selcraig, supra note 4, at 50.
27. Id.; see also Gary M. Anthes, Stealth E-mail Poses Corporate Security Risk,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 12, 1996, at 1, 57. These sites are often located in foreign countries.
28. Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D1. The FBI and the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE) have led the way in these types of sting operations, with a growing number
of local police departments across the country following suit. The September, 1995 national sting,
discussed in the Introduction, was coordinated by the Baltimore office of the FBI with assistance




cases pictures) on their hard disk. This information becomes part of
the evidence file against the particular suspect.31 Often relying on
informants, agents may log between twenty and forty hours a week
developing their investigations, spending nights and weekends
online. 2
Law enforcement usually catches targets for the crime of sex
solicitation using one of two methods. The first method requires the
suspect and the "minor" to set up a meeting. Then, when the suspect
shows up at the arranged spot, he will be nabbed by the police?3 To
apprehend suspects for distribution of obscenity, police must first
compile enough evidence from transmitted messages and illegal
pornographic material. At that point, agents can obtain warrants to
compel the service provider to reveal the identity of the user, and then
search the suspect's home and seize computers and diskettes.'
Suspects are generally prosecuted under the Federal Child Protection
Act and state laws which prohibit child sex solicitation. 5
31. Id.
32. Larrabee, supra note 16, at 1A.
33. Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D01.
34. Electronic Privacy Communication Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994)[hereinafter ECPA]; see
also Labatron, supra note 5, at Al. As noted above, tracking can be difficult if the transmissions
occur on the unmonitored areas of cyberspace. The only arrests for child pornography
distribution to date have been large distributors where the images clearly depicted minors and
were explicit. Solicitation arrests have only been for those who arrange and show up at a face to
face meeting. Quinn, supra note 1, at Al.
35. See generally Kim Murphy, Ruling Narrows the Scope of Child Pornography, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1987, at 32. However, the Communications Decency Act (CDA), a provision of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, establishes criminal penalties for individuals who make
"indecent" material available to minors online. Carolyn Lochhead, Congress Eases Telecomm
Rules, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 2, 1996, at Al. Although the provision faces court challenges, see ACLU
v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), probable jurisdiction noted, 117 S. Ct. 554 (1996), the
CDA could potentially widen law enforcement's net for prosecuting online pedophiles and child
pornographers by changing the conduct which is actionable. Whereas law enforcement could
previously only prosecute obscenity, the new law allows for the prosecution of "indecent"
conduct, which is, arguably, a lower standard. See William P. Keane, Impact of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 on Federal Prosecutions of Computer Dissemination of
Obscenity, Indecency, and Child Pornography, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 853, 862-65 (1996).
This new law will not affect the analysis herein which deals with the procedural aspects of
entrapment and does not discuss the content of the actionable conduct. Regardless of the
constitutional validity of the CDA, the current state of entrapment law appears to allow police to
engage in their current behavior to catch online pedophiles.
A discussion of obscenity is beyond the scope of this Note, but obscenity issues may be
implicated as related to the entrapment issues in this context. For a further discussion of
obscenity issues and the Internet, see Robert F. Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire,
There's a Chill on the Internet The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online
Communications, 29 GA. L. REV. 1075 (1995).
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These online investigative techniques have developed on an ad
hoc basis, raising a number of concerns about unbridled police
discretion in the use of deceptive tactics in cyberspace. Despite law
enforcement claims that they only respond to complaints about
specific chat rooms or users, critics complain that by "trolling the net,"
undercover cops are engaging in a "fishing expedition" based on mere
generalized suspicion. Civil libertarians argue that such practices
violate the First Amendment and implicate a user's privacy rights.
36
Additionally, amateur and commercial bulletin board system
operators ("sysops") fear being shut down by overzealous
investigators.
37
Critics are also concerned by what they see as an inefficient
allocation of police resources. 8 The targeted communications are
apparently only a small fraction of all the communication on the
Internet and commercial networks.' Although the FBI does not keep
official statistics, according to unofficial estimates the number of
pedophiles in the United States is estimated at 100,000. 0 If all of them
are on the Internet, which has an estimated fifteen to twenty million
users, that means these potential criminals comprise barely one-half of
one percent of the population of Internet users.41 Further, critics
question whether the government is really creating crime: Are the
police really making the world a safer place by tempting some of these
people to commit crimes they may not have otherwise committed?
42
36. Quinn, supra note 1, at Al; Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D01.
37. Larrabee, supra note 16, at Al. Under existing law the government can shut down a
system for transporting pornography. However, it is also a crime to read someone's e-mail under
the ECPA unless criminal activity is suspected. So sysops face a double bind. Id. A discussion of
privacy expectations is beyond the scope of this Note but will be touched on in the context of
entrapment issues.
38. Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D01. The FBI unit now has more than $1 million
worth of equipment, including high speed modems and large data storage devices. Agents spend
evenings and weekends online, and take turns using the computers, choosing from a list of
aliases/user profiles. In cases where computers have been seized, the agents have run up against
password-protected and encrypted files which have taken technicians hundreds of hours to
decode. The eight member squad is planning to expand, and local police departments in
Washington D.C. and Baltimore are expected to join the Bureau in developing a regional task
force on online child sex crimes. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Selcraig, supra note 4, at 51; Larrabee, supra note 16, at 1A.
42. Chandrasekaran, supra note 2, at D01. Further, although sending racy messages is not
yet illegal, it potentially will be if the newly passed CDA withstands constitutional challenge. See
generally Keane, supra note 35. If the law is upheld, the police would be engaging in unlawful
conduct in the name of crime prevention. The question is whether or not this is justified.




A. Levels of Interaction: Terms and Definitions
"Cyberspace" is defined as the "electronic space created by a
computer system or a computer network which the user can explore at
will. ' I The Internet is the largest of the computer networks, and links
millions of computers around the world.45 By conservative estimates,
as of 1995 twenty million people were connected "online."' Internet
access is relatively easy to obtain,-one needs only a computer,
modem, phone line, and inexpensive communications software.47 A so-
called Internet Service Provider (ISP) allows a user access to the
Internet. ISPs such as AOL allow access for a monthly fee, while
universities, government entities, and private companies also
frequently invest in the infrastructure required to go online.
8
Having access to the Internet means having the ability to send
and receive electronic mail,49 to search (or "browse") for information
and upload and download files from servers5 on other computers, and
to join discussions on numerous electronic bulletin board systems
("BBSs").51 The discussion in this Note concerns interactions using
e-mail, BBSs, FTP,52 and the World Wide Web.
43. As indicated above, "cyberspace" is a term that will be used loosely in this Note to
describe all communications transmitted using an electronic computer network. The analysis
herein does not require the reader to have an in-depth understanding of computer networks; a
general familiarity with the terms, levels of access, and general characteristics of the forum is all
that is necessary. For a more detailed discussion of this communications medium, see ADAM
GAFFIN, EFF's GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (formerly THE BIG DUMMY'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET) 22
(1994).
44. BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, INTERNET IN PLAIN ENGLISH 113 (2d. ed. 1996).
45. Id. at 114.
46. Id. See also George P. Long, Symposium Comment, Who Are You? Identity and
Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (1994).
47. Id. at 1180.
48. Id. Commercial service providers offer a variety of services including Internet access, e-
mail, games, informational libraries, "chat rooms," and public bulletin boards. Id.
49. Electronic mail, e-mail for short, is a means of communicating by sending typed
messages between computers that are linked together electronically. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note
44, at 145-48. See infra discussion Part II.A.1.
50. A "server" is defined as "a program that receives requests for information from a client
program [operated by the user], locates the information and sends it back to the client [and the
user]." PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 388.
51. BBSs are public areas on an electronic network where users may post messages and
read messages previously posted by others. Id. at 65-66. Chat rooms, or "internet relay chats,"
are a special type of BBS offered by commercial ventures. AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy
[VOL. 19:157
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1. Electronic Mail
Electronic mail, or "e-mail," is a private message system allowing
users to communicate with each other and is available on most
computer networks. A sender may transmit a message to another
individual (or group) by addressing it to the recipient's user name. The
message is only accessible by the addressee. E-mail has been
described as being like regular mail, only faster.-' Although
instantaneous, like a phone call, it does not allow for simultaneous
dialogue and does not require the addressee to be online when the
sender transmits the message.55 Instead the message will bewaiting for
the addressee when the individual next accesses his or her account.
56
Generally, there is a greater expectation of privacy with e-mail
exchanges than with any other level of interaction in cyberspace,
because the messages are generally not for public distribution. 57
2. Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs)
In contrast to e-mail, any user on a BBS can read and respond to
the messages posted therein.58 These transactions are instantaneous,
and the level of interaction on BBSs has been likened to CB radios. In
this sense, these areas are public. There is no expectation of privacy,
market these chat rooms as allowing users to visit simulated bars, join political debates, or enjoy
"cybersex" with other users while onlookers "watch." Goldman, supra note 35, at 1083. Private
chat lines, which are unmonitored, may require a password for access. Id.
Internet users may also subscribe to the Usenet, a network of thousands of special interest
newsgroups. Newsgroups are BBSs which are devoted to the discussion of a specific topic. A
newsgroup consists of postings which are addressed to the group rather than a particular
individual. Some postings respond to existing postings, while others start a new subject.
PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 324. "There are close to 5,000 newsgroups on the Usenet, each
offering an area of special interest" to "like-minded users." Goldman, supra note 35, at 1086.
Most relevant for the purposes of this Note, some newsgroups are devoted solely to erotica,
therapeutic discussions of sex, or may contain large amounts of pornography. Id.
52. See infra Part II.A.3.
53. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 145-48.
54. Id. at 145-46.
55. Id. at 146.
56. Id.
57. See discussion infra Part II.B. This makes law enforcement interception of e-mail more
offensive than when the same type of conduct is perpetrated at a public level of interaction. The
intimacy of the messages is often at issue in cases involving expressions made in the course of
stalking and assault crimes. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1086.
58. Long, supra note 46, at 1181.
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and thus users should assume the risk that anyone, including police,
may be present. 5
An estimated 100,000 BBSs operate in the United States.60 They
range in size from large commercial networks which serve millions of
users, like AOL or CompuServe, to small boards run by schools,
companies, and special interest groups, which may be accessible to as
few as ten people.
61
While commercial boards frequently require a subscription
agreement prior to access, most BBSs are open to anyone with the
necessary equipment. 2 The user dials the number of the bulletin
board through his or her computer, which is then linked to the
"central" host computer.' This is controlled by a program on the host
computer which allows users to access stored information. Although
such programs are designed to run with minimal human intervention,
most BBSs have a system operator who manages the central
computer.' The sysop may moderate discussions, or, on commercial
systems, contract with information providers.
65
Once connected to the board, the individual enters a username
which is used to address messages to the user. The user may not have
access to all sections of the board: certain areas may require special
software, a password, or the payment of additional fees. 6
59. Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum? Computer Bulletin Boards, Free
Speech and State Action, 81 GEo L.J. 409, 416-17 (1992).
60. Bob Schwabach, Bulletin Board System Alternatives to Net Home Page, STAR TRIB., Jan.
25, 1996, at 2D.
61. Id.; see also PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 65-66. Amateur BBSs are easy to set up:
an individual wishing to do so needs only a modem and a computer with a bulletin board
program. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. There are also numerous amateur or underground BBSs which are not accessible
through the Internet or Usenet that are accessible through Telnet. Telnet is the remote logon
from one computer to another which allows users to connect directly to each other without going
through a service provider. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1082.
64. A sysop is usually a hobbyist who maintains a BBS or serves as a newsgroup moderator.
PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 409.
65. Some commercial service providers use the sysop to monitor and screen out messages
that are deemed inappropriate. Long, supra note 46, at 1180.
66. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1086. There is arguably a greater expectation of privacy on
restricted access areas.
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3. FTP & the World Wide Web
FTP stands for "file transfer protocol" and is the "transfer of
actual computer files among networked computers."' Thus, an FTP
user is a visitor to someone else's hard drive. By connecting his or her
computer to the Internet by modem, the owner of the FTP site has
opened up their hard drive to other users who can come in and
download material or leave material for the owner or other visitors.6
The World Wide Web is one of the Internet's most popular
information-resource discovery tools. It allows a user to browse or
"surf the Net," and makes online information extremely accessible.
For computer novices, this facilitates searches which previously would
have required advanced computer knowledge.' Graphic image
sections, in particular, create problems with children surfing the Net
unmonitored. °
B. Unique Attributes of Cyberspace
The unique attributes which make cyberspace an attractive forum
for expression also create an environment well-suited to criminal
activity because police detection of criminals and prevention of crimes
is difficult.' The anonymity of online users and their ability to
roleplay (assuming whatever role the user chooses) are freedoms
which clearly do not exist in face-to-face interactions.2 The ephemeral
online community and the potential for brief contact provide online
criminals with safe cover.73 Although large service providers require
identification from those who want to use their services, some people
have managed to register with fake identification. Consequently, on
the Internet, where there is no central control, and on small bulletin
boards run by amateurs, who do not always require individuals to
identify themselves, it is difficult to track down a person hiding behind
the computer screen.74
67. Id. at 1082.
68. Id.
69. PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 44, at 473-74; Goldman, supra note 35, at 1088.
70. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1088.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1082 n.42 (listing examples of men pretending to be women in chat room setting);
see also Long, supra note 46, at 1184-85.
73. Kim Murphy, supra note 11 (explaining near impossibility of detecting criminal activity
during extremely brief computer communications).
74. Pedicini, supra note 16.
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The ease of online access to information and to other users with
shared interests is very attractive. For pedophiles, this means that if
they encounter an unreceptive child, they can easily move on to the
next target.75 For computer-savvy kids, this means access to adult-
oriented forums and all sorts of material-images and conversation
topics-that would be restricted or prohibited to them in a real world
context.76
Cyberspace, paradoxically, can feel like an intimate setting, yet be
fraught with the potential for deception.7 The free-flowing exchanges
of typed conversation and anonymity foster a lack of inhibition. As a
result, people say things online that they would not in other contexts.
This may be due to the shedding of inhibitions that typically
accompany exchanges in person or on the phone:' Additionally, the
form of the online message allows for levels of deception not available
in face to face interactions. The lack of qualities such as voice
inflection or body language make humor or sarcasm difficult to detect,
and heightens the ability to deceive. 9 While this is perfect for police
undercover operations, it also creates the potential for police to abuse
deceptive techniques.
III
History of Entrapment Law
A. Origin and Underlying Goals
Undercover police investigations have become commonplace in
law enforcement.' The main justification for such practices is the
difficulty of detecting and prosecuting consensual crimes, such as drug
dealing, prostitution, gambling, and bribery.' Additionally, deception
has replaced traditional coersive police practices as the courts have
interpreted the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to restrict
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (explaining while in comfort of their own homes, kids are more likely to forget they
are talking to strangers).
78. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1086 (describing student sending death threats to President
Clinton).
79. Id. at 1084.
80. Steven Duke, Entrapment Defense Languishes in a Permanent State of Confusion, NAT'L
L.J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 30.
81. Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of
Entrapment Law and Related Defenses in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 831 (1992).
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traditional strong-arm techniques.! This has led to the development of
a variety of undercover techniques in many different criminal contexts.
Currently, the majority of major police departments have permanent
undercover units. Such operations can be a dependable and efficient
way to produce a large number of arrests. Additionally, these
operations are perceived as more challenging and interesting than
patrolling a beat, and hence, are more likely to produce headlines and
promotions.8
Police undercover operations have raised questions regarding
how much the government can involve itself in crime by providing the
means and opportunity to violate the law.8 Such investigations are
considered ethically problematic because of the government's
participation in criminal activity and the public's fear that government
surveillance will be used to oppress law-abiding citizens. 8
The entrapment defense has developed as the chief means of
limiting deceptive police practices.' The doctrine has been the subject
of five major Supreme Court decisions, and is the law in both state and
federal courts.8' Properly applied, the defense should, under the
prevailing view, balance individual rights and liberties with legitimate
law enforcement objectives. 89 To be justified, police deception must be
limited to detecting and catching existing criminal enterprises.
90
Additionally, the entrapment defense should also promote the
efficient allocation of police resources. The doctrine recognizes that it
is unproductive for police to expend time and energy, or engage in
unlawful activity, in order to induce otherwise law abiding citizens to
commit crime.91
82. Duke, supra note 80, at 30.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1068.
86. Brian Thomas Feeney, Note, Scrutiny for the Serpent: The Court Refines Entrapment
Law in Jacobson v. United States, 42 CATH. U.L. REV. 1027, 1028 (1993)(citing Jonathan C.
Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations for the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REv.
1011,1012 (1987)).
87. Duke, supra note 80, at 30.
88. Id.
89. Feeney, supra note 86, at 1028 (citing Maura F.J. Whelan, Comment, Lead Us Not Into
(Unwarranted) Temptation: A Proposal to Replace the Entrapment Defense With a Reasonable
Suspicion Requirement, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (1985)).
90. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1093, n. 179 (citing Ted K. Yasuda, Note, Entrapment as a
Due Process Defense: Developments After Hampton v. United States, 57 IND. L.J. 89, 120-21
(1982)).
91. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1090-91.
B. Subjective Versus Objective Debate
Since the entrapment doctrine was first recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in 1932.92 there has been an ongoing debate
regarding the proper theoretical basis for the defense and its practical
application. 3 This controversy has resulted in two approaches to
applying the entrapment defense: the "subjective" and "objective"
tests. Although the subjective test has historically been favored by the
Supreme Court and is the law in federal courts, several state
legislatures and a number of state courts, including California, have
adopted the objective test. 4 The following section examines the
development of each test and provides a summary of existing legal
standards. 5
1. The Subjective Test
The Supreme Court first set out the subjective test for entrapment
in Sorrells v. United States.96 In Sorrells, the defendant was convicted
of selling and possessing liquor after he sold whiskey to an undercover
agent posing as a tourist during the prohibition era.' The sale
occurred after three attempts by the agent to make illegal purchases.
98
There was no evidence that Sorrells had been involved in any
bootlegging activity prior to his contact with the agent. In inducing
92. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The entrapment doctrine was first applied
by a federal appellate court seventeen years previously. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412
(9th Cir. 1915)(reversing conviction where defendant's resistance to commit crime was overcome
by undercover agent's repeated solicitations). The entrapment issue first reached the Supreme
Court in 1928 when Justice Brandeis, in a dissenting opinion, called for its adoption, arguing that
this prosecution should be stopped to "protect the Government. To protect it from illegal
conduct of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts." Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413,
425 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
93. Bennett, supra note 81, at 833-38.
94. Id. at 835. The objective test is favored by the majority of commentators and was
supported by a persistent minority of Supreme Court Justices until Mathews v. United States, 485
U.S. 58 (1988).
95. The discussion of the subjective test will be confined to analyses of Supreme Court
precedents. A discussion of the subjective test, as applied by some lower federal courts and a
majority of state courts, is beyond the scope of this Note. The discussion of the objective test
includes the reasoning of minority Supreme Court Justices in the Court's entrapment decisions,
and an examination of two state court decisions adopting the objective approach. See People v.
Barraza, 591 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1979); People v. Turner, 210 N.W. 2d. 336 (Mich. 1973).
96. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
97. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 439.40.
98. Id. at 439.
99. Id. at 441.
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the defendant to commit the crime, the agent utilized his common
military experience with the defendant.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the conviction based
on entrapment grounds. However, the justices were divided regarding
the justification and the procedural elements of the defense. 10W The
majority adopted what is now known as the "subjective" test of
entrapment, reasoning that the defense should be available because
Congress did not intend to punish "otherwise innocent" citizens who
would not have violated the law but for the creative activities of
government agents. 1°1 Thus, the majority concluded, a defendant with
no criminal predisposition, who is induced by government agents to
commit a criminal act, would fall outside the scope of the applicable
statute."' However, the majority noted that the prosecution could
rebut an entrapment claim by presenting proof of the defendant's
predisposition to commit the crime.'w Because such individuals could
not qualify as "otherwise innocent," they could be prosecuted and
punished.'
The subjective test was reaffirmed in Sherman v. United States.1°5
In that case, the defendant was convicted of selling illegal drugs to a
government informant he met at a drug rehabilitation center where
they were both undergoing treatment.106 The agent asked Sherman
several times to sell him drugs, allegedly to relieve the agent's
withdrawal symptoms.' ° After initially refusing, the defendant
complied and was arrested. I In successfully rebutting the entrapment
defense at trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the
100. Id. at 453-59. The division within the Court in Sorrells laid the foundation for all of the
Court's subsequent discussions of the entrapment defense. The three concurring justices favored
a test for entrapment reviewing police conduct without reference to the defendant's disposition.
This approach is now known as the "objective" test. See Harrison, supra note 6, at 1076-77; see
also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing objective test).
101. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52. In Sorrells, the majority distinguished between the
justifiable use of deceptive practices by government agents to detect existing criminal enterprises
and the improper use of such practices to create crime. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 451.
104. Id. (holding "an appropriate and searching inquiry" into a defendant's past is necessary
to determine whether defendant was otherwise innocent) Id.
105. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
106. Id. at 371.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 370-71.
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defendant's two prior drug convictions: a nine-year old conviction for
selling drugs and a five-year old conviction for drug possession.'9
The Supreme Court reversed Sherman's conviction, finding that
he had been entrapped as a matter of law." 0 The majority held that
under the subjective approach to entrapment the evidence of the
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime was insufficient."' The
majority reasoned that the prior convictions were not probative of the
defendant's willingness to sell drugs at the time in question."1
Significantly, the majority did not completely ignore the government
agent's behavior. The Court noted that such conduct illustrated "an
evil" which entrapment doctrine is designed to overcome (namely
inducing a recovering addict to sell and return to using drugs)."
3
The next significant development in the evolution of the
entrapment doctrine came in 1973 when the Court elevated the
importance of predisposition. In Russell v. United States,"4 the Court
adopted a per se rule that once predisposition is shown, the defense of
entrapment is not available to the defendant. 115 In that case, the
defendant was convicted of unlawfully manufacturing and selling
drugs after accepting an undercover agent's offer to supply him with a
rare, but legal, chemical, that was essential to the manufacture of
"speed.""' 6 At the time he was approached, Russell was involved in an
ongoing drug manufacturing operation." 7 In exchange, the agent
gained access to the defendant's speed lab and half of the product." 8
109. Id. at 375.
110. Id. at 369.
111. Id. at 375-76.
112. Id. at 375. The law is now clear that the relevant time period for examining
predisposition is at the time the government agent approaches the person. Law enforcement
agents may not approach a defendant who is initially unwilling to commit an offense and then
induce him to become a criminal. Bennett, supra note 81, at 838 n.62 (citing Jacobson v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992)). For a further discussion of Jacobson, see infra text
accompanying notes 133-156.
113. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376. At least one commentator has noted that this particular
inducement "would not have caused an average person to commit the offense." Feeney, supra
note 86, at 1040 (citing Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163, 174
(1976)).
114. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
115. Id. at 436.
116. Id. at 425-26.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 425.
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,
based on a Fifth Amendment due process argument.119 The appellate
court reasoned that when intolerable governmental participation in a
crime was found, as in Russell, the traditional entrapment inquiry into
predisposition of a defendant was irrelevant.'m
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the convictionY' The Court held
that the entrapment defense is only applicable where "the criminal
design originates with the officials of the Government, and they
implant in the mind of an innocent person [through deception] the
disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in
order that they may prosecute."' In contrast, where the defendant is
engaged in an already existing criminal enterprise, as Russell was, he is
treated not as an "unwary innocent," but as an "unwary criminal."'
The majority suggested a separate due process defense could be
available in situations where the government conduct was sufficiently
"outrageous," regardless of the accused's predisposition.' However,
the Court failed to define a standard to assess "outrageousness." The
Court noted that the due process defense was not available in Russell
because the government had used "the only practicable means of
detection."' As such, the Court concluded, the government's "limited
participation" did not violate the due process clause.'
The Court eliminated the possibility of a separate due process
defense three years later in Hampton v. United States.' The majority
suggested that the remedy for outrageous police conduct was to
prosecute the offending law enforcement officials under the applicable
state law rather than to free the equally culpable defendant.' In
Hampton, the defendant was charged with selling drugs to an
undercover agent which had been supplied to him by another
119. Id. at 424-25.
120. Id. at 427. The court of appeals believed that the government's involvement in this
crime, by supplying an essential ingredient, was intolerable. Id. However, it was unclear exactly
what due process right of the defendant had been violated. United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671,
673 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423,425 (1973).
121. Russell, 411 U.S. at 420-21.
122. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 472 (1932)).
123. Id. at 436 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
124. Id. at 431-33.
125. Id. at 432.
126. Id. at 431-433.
127. 425 U.S. 484 (1976)(plurality opinion).
128. Id. at 490.
1996]
government agent.' Although evidence of predisposition barred the
defense of entrapment, the defendant claimed the government's
conduct was so outrageous that a conviction violated his due process
rights.' Although recognizing the degree of government involvement
in the crime was greater here than in Russell, the majority held the
police conduct still did not rise to the level of outrageousness required
for a due process violation.' Additionally, the Court determined that
the protections of the Due Process Clause were only applicable when
some recognized fundamental right of the defendant had been
violated, which the Court found was not the case in Hampton.1m
In 1992, the Supreme Court resolved the subjective-objective
debate in favor of the subjective approach.' In Jacobson v. United
States, the Court held that the relevant time period for examining a
defendant's predisposition is at the time a law enforcement agent
approaches the suspect, not when the crime is committed.34 In that
case, the defendant was convicted of purchasing illegal child
pornography from an undercover agent after being aggressively
129. Id. at 485-88.
130. Id. at 489.
131. Id.
132. Id. Lower federal courts recognize the due process defense of outrageous governmental
conduct as "having 'survived the Court's review in Hampton."' Bennett, supra note 81, at 857-58
n.228 (citing United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986)(quoting United States v.
Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated sub. noma. United States v. Wingender, 790
F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986))); see also United States v. Osbourne, 935 F.2d 32, 35-37 (4th Cir.
1991)(analyzing but rejecting defendant's claim of the defense). Nonetheless, lower federal
courts have been reluctant to allow the defense. Bennett, supra note 81, at 860. To date, only two
circuits have ordered indictments dismissed in response to the outrageous governmental conduct
defense. Id. at 859 n.244 (citing United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d. Cir. 1978); Greene v.
United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971)(predating Hampton) and United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973)(still useful since the court rejected the entrapment defense, but used an
outrageous governmental conduct test)). At least five district courts have dismissed indictments
on a finding of outrageous governmental conduct by prosecutors or law enforcement officers. Id.
at 859 n.245 (citing United States v. Marshank, 777 F. Supp. 1507 (N.D. Cal. 1991)(prosecutorial
misconduct)); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1991)(prosecutorial
misconduct); United States v. Isgro, 751 F. Supp. 846 (C.D. Cal. 1990)(prosecutorial misconduct),
rev'd, No. 90-50531, 1992 WL 208434 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1992); United States v. Gardner, 658 F.
Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 1987)(misconduct of government agent); United States v. Batres-Santolino,
521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981)(misconduct of government agent). A further discussion of the
due process defense is beyond the scope of this Note.
133. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992). The Court's opinion in Mathews v.
United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1987), effectively settled the Supreme Court's debate over the
subjective and objective approaches. The fact that the debate did not reoccur in Jacobson
suggests that no current justice on the Court seems remotely interested in adopting the objective
approach. Bennett, supra note 81, at 867.
134. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542.
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targeted by the United States Postal Service for a twenty-six month
period1 5
The agency identified Jacobson as a potential customer of child
pornography after the police discovered his name on a legal mailing
list of a reputed California pornography book store.'3 Posing as a
member of an organization advocating sexual freedom, a postal
investigator sent Jacobson a membership application and sexual
attitude survey.' After completing the questionaire which revealed
his preference for preteen sex, Jacobson mailed it in and enrolled in
the organization. m The postal agency then mailed him another survey
and a list of "pen pals" who purportedly shared his sexual interests.L
9
Jacobson began corresponding with one of these "pen pals," an
undercover postal inspector, after the agent initiated
correspondence. 140 Over a two and a half year period, Jacobson
received two surveys, seven letters measuring his appetite for child
pornography, and two sex catalogues from phony organizations.' He
responded on eight occasions and finally purchased a "pornographic
magazine depicting young boys engaged in various sexual activities"
from a Postal Service catalogue. 141
At trial, the jury rejected the defendant's entrapment and
outrageous governmental conduct defenses.143 On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the government must
have a "reasonable suspicion" of wrongdoing before targeting an
individual.'4 The Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel
decision, holding the evidence had shown the defendant was a
predisposed child pornography consumer and the government's
conduct was not outrageous. 14
135. Id. at 542-43.
136. Id. at 543. Jacobson had previously ordered two legal magazines from the book store in
1984 featuring nude adolescent boys and a brochure listing stores that carried sexually explicit
materials. Id. at 542-43.
137. Id. at 543-44. The government-created materials urged Jacobson to purchase the
outlawed material and thus help fight censorship and protect individual rights. Id. at 544.
138. Id. at 544.
139. Id. at 544-46.
140. Id. at 545.
141. Id. at 543-46.
142. Id. at 546.
143. United States v. Jacobson, 916 F.2d 467, 468-70 (8th Cir. 1990)(en banc), rev'd, 503 U.S.
540 (1992).
144. United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, vacated, 899 F.2d 1549 (8th Cir. 1990).
145. Jacobson, 916 F.2d at 467.
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In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
conviction.1' The Court held the prosecution had failed to show the
defendant was "predisposed, independent of the Government's
acts ...to violate the law by receiving child pornography through
the mails."'" The Court reasoned that government agents may not
originate a criminal design, plant in an innocent person's mind the
disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce the commission
of a crime.148 Noting that lawful conduct may not be used to show
predisposition to break the law, the Court found that it was unlikely
that Jacobson would have acted (although clearly interested in the
material) had it not been for prolonged government courting)
49
Additionally, the Court reasoned that the government had exerted
additional pressure on the defendant to break the law by appealing to
First Amendment values in challenging the constitutionality of
censorship of sexually explicit materials.m° Thus, the Court concluded
the government had not established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant "possessed the requisite predisposition prior to the




The entrapment defense, in its current state, focuses solely on the
defendant's predisposition. To raise the defense the accused must
show evidence of government conduct that causes or induces an
undisposed person to commit a crime.'m One can be induced by
"persuasion, fraudulent representations, threats, coercercive tactics,
harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on sympathy, need, or
friendship."'  Furthermore, "[the] defendant may also attempt to
introduce expert testimony to show that he would be extremely
susceptible to, and would likely comply with, suggestions put forward
146. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
147. Id. at 553.
148. Id. (citing Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
149. Id. at 550-53. The majority noted that Jacobson was not merely offered the opportunity
to purchase child pornography, he was targeted repeatedly by the government over a prolonged
period of twenty-six months. Id. at 550.
150. Id. at 552.
151. Id. at 553.
152. Bennett, supra note 81, at 842-43. In the entrapment context, "inducement" is
distinguished from solicitation, defined as the "mere request by a law enforcement officer that
the defendant engage in criminal activity." Id. at 843.
153. Id. (citing United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1004 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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by an authoritative figure such as a law enforcement officer" to
commit illegal acts.'
To rebut the entrapment claim, the prosecution must show that
the accused was predisposed at the time law enforcement approached
the accused. Although the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance regarding what factors go into the determination of
predisposition, the cases suggest the Court has been willing to adopt a
sliding scale for the amount of predisposition needed to defeat the
claim, requiring a greater showing if the police conduct or government
involvement was extremely egregious.'
Lower federal courts have identified factors to be considered in
the predisposition analysis. 5 These factors include:
(1) the defendant's reluctance to respond to the inducement; (2) the
totality of circumstances surrounding the criminal enterprise; (3) the
defendant's state of mind prior to any overtures by the government;
(4) the defendant's involvement in pre-existing criminal conduct
similar to that for which he is charged; (5) the existence of a prior
plan on the part of the defendant to commit the crime for which he
is charged; (6) the defendant's prior reputation; (7) the defendant's
reluctance or eagerness during negotiations with the undercover
agent; (8) whether there was a pattern of refusing the government
inducements prior to the action for which the defendant is charged;
(9) the nature of the crime charged; (10) the degree of coercion
present in the police conduct in inducing the activity relative to the
defendant's criminal experience.L
These elements are designed to show whether the defendant was
going to commit the crime even in the absence of police
154. Bennett, supra note 81, at 853 n.191 (citing United States v. Roark, 753 F.2d 991, 994-95
(11th Cir. 1985)(noting "trial court committed reversible error by not allowing expert testimony
of clinical psychologist that defendant was extremely susceptible to suggestions to show
confession was involuntary")). Experts may testify concerning the defendant's personality
makeup, the "defendant's psychological susceptibility to the inducement, and the defendant's
lack of predisposition." Bennett, supra note 81, at 853 (citing MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK
OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.4, at 631 n.8 (3d ed. 1991)).
155. See generally Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540,540 (1992).
156. See, e.g., Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550-54 (upholding entrapment defense despite
defendant's prior purchases of child pornography, criticizing prolonged period of government
solicitation and use of First Amendment values to induce criminal activity). See also Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373-76 (1958)(upholding entrapment defense despite defendant's
two prior convictions for similar offenses calling government agent's appeal to defendant's drug
addiction "evil").
157. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1083-84.
158. United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734
(1986).
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involvement.m The standard jury instruction for entrapment reflects a
similar idea, stating that a person is entrapped if he "has no previous
intent or purpose to violate the law," but is not entrapped if he was
"ready and willing to commit crimes such as charged in the indictment,
whenever the opportunity was afforded."'6 °
3. The Objective Test
In contrast to the subjective test, the objective test for entrapment
scrutinizes the government's role in the investigation without regard to
the particular defendant's predisposition. 6' This approach is based on
the perceived public policy of protecting the integrity of law
enforcement practices.' 12
Prior to 1992, the objective approach had been consistently
advocated by a minority of Supreme Court justices." Justice Roberts
argued in Sorrells that the proper focus for entrapment analysis was on
the conduct of law enforcement officers in the creation and execution
of criminal enterprise."6 Under this objective test, the entrapment
defense would be decided solely by the court."6 Justice Roberts
reasoned that (1) the entrapment defense should deter undesirable
police conduct and not free otherwise guilty defendants; (2) courts
have the inherent authority to bar government entrapment without
relying on a fictional statement of legislative intent; and (3) the
defendant's predisposition has nothing to do with whether the
particular police conduct was permissible.'
Following Sorrells, Justice Frankfurter argued for an objective
entrapment test in Sherman v. United States.' He reasoned that if
police are going to induce crime, they should do so in a manner which
would only incite those who are "ready and willing" criminals, not
159. Id.
160. Duke, supra note 80, at 32 (quoting DEvIrr & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
INSTRUCTIONS § 13.13, at 290-91 (2d. ed. 1979)).
161. The "dispositive issue is 'whether an agent used an improper inducement."' Feeney,
supra note 86, at 1043 n.120 (citing Park, supra note 113). Arguably the same type of inducement
could trigger the entrapment defense under either test. See Duke, supra note 80, at 32 (arguing
subjective test is more inclusive).
162. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (Roberts J., concurring).
163. Id. The test was first articulated by a three-justice minority in Sorrells.
164. Id. at 454 (Roberts, J., concurring).
165. Id.
166. Id. (stating whatever defendant's past crimes, punishment does not justify commission
of new crimes). Id. at 458.
167. 356 U.S. 369,378 (1958)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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induce those who "would normally avoid crime and through self-
struggle resist ordinary temptations."' Further, he argued that courts
should intervene where "the methods employed on behalf of the
Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced"
regardless of a particular defendant's predisposition.
16
Most recently, Justice Stewart argued in Russell v. United States
that the focus on predisposition makes a convicted defendant
continuously vulnerable to the police.' He contended that if the
government's conduct was apt to cause an average person to commit
the crime, the defendant should be acquitted regardless of the
predisposition of the particular defendant involved. 1'
A number of state legislatures1 " and several state supreme courts,
including California, have adopted the objective test.' 3 The California
Supreme Court has rejected the subjective test as set forth by the
United States Supreme Court.174 In People v. Barraza, the California
Supreme Court adopted an objective standard for entrapment, which
questioned whether "the conduct of the law enforcement agent [was]
likely to induce a normal law-abiding person to commit [an]
offense." 175 In that case the defendant was a recovering drug addict
168. Id. at 384.
169. Id. at 380.
170. 411 U.S. 423, 443 (1973)(Stewart, J, dissenting).
171. Id. See also Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,495-500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
172. Bennett, supra note 81, at 835 n.37. States which have adopted the objective test
legislatively include: Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Kansas, New Hampshire, New York, North
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah.
173. State supreme courts which have adopted the objective approach include: California,
Iowa, Michigan, New Mexico, and Vermont. Id. Other states combine the objective and
subjective tests. Id. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §11.81.450 (Michie 1989); State v. Hunter, 568 So.2d.
319, 321-22 (Fla. 1991); State v. Johnson, 606 A.2d. 315, 319 (N.J. 1992); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11,
§432 (1987); GA. CODE. ANN. §16-3-25 (1992); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 38/7-12 (West 1989); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. §505.010 (Michie 1990); Bennett, supra note 81, at 835 n.38. The objective test
has been consistently favored by a majority of commentators. Id. at 837. This approach has
also been advocated in the Model Penal Code, id. at 835 n.38; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13
(official draft 1962), the United States National Commission on the Reform of Federal Laws, and
the Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Justice Department.
Bennett, supra note 81, at 835 nn.39-40 (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAws: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE §702(2) (1971)(prohibiting use of
"'persuasion or other means likely to cause normally law abiding citizens to commit the
offense."'); FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMmiTTEE To STUDY UNDERCOVER ACTIVITIES OF
COMPONENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, S.Rep. No. 682,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 362 (1982)).
174. People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947,955 (Cal. 1979).
175. Id. To justify its approach, the court noted that commentators had overwhelmingly
favored the objective approach and that other states had adopted a similar approach, either
judicially or legislatively. Id. at 954-55.
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who, after persistent requests from an undercover officer, put the
agent in touch with a narcotics dealer.'76
Expressing a concern with preserving the integrity of law
enforcement activity, the California Supreme Court held that the
entrapment test should focus on whether the police conduct creates an
unusually attractive motive for crime in a law-abiding citizen beyond
the immediate ill-gotten gain.' 7 The court concluded that under this
test, inquiries regarding the defendant's predisposition or character
were irrelevant.'
The Michigan Supreme Court has also adopted an objective
approach to the entrapment defense.179 In Turner, the defendant was
convicted of selling illegal drugs after he agreed to obtain heroin for
an undercover agent. The officer had untruthfully told him that his
girlfriend would leave him unless the defendant provided her with the
drug.' ° Turner had refused the agent's requests on a number of
previous occasions and also refused to make future purchases for
him.' 81
Applying the objective test, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that Turner had been entrapped as a matter of law and reversed his
conviction.18 The court reasoned that the "central issue in entrapment
cases" was whether the police conduct was so reprehensible that a
conviction resulting therefrom could not stand.183
The Michigan Supreme Court determined that the type of
conduct involved in Turner could not be tolerated by the courts.1 4 The
impermissible aspects included the police's persistence in targeting the
176. Id. at 949-50. The defendant was initially reluctant because he feared returning to
prison, but quickly provided the dealer's name once the agent assured him that she was not a
police officer. Id. at 949.
177. Id. at 955. The court provided examples of impermissible police conduct, including: (1)
an overture to the target based on friendship or sympathy, instead of a desire for personal gain;
(2) an inducement which "would guarantee that the act [was] not illegal;" and (3) "an offer of
exorbitant consideration" for the proposed criminal activity. Id.
178. Id. at 956. Under this model, entrapment is still an issue for the jury to decide. Id. at 956
n.6.
179. People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. 1973).
180. Id. at 337-38. The agent had unsucessfully tried over a two year period to get Turner to
sell him narcotics.
181. Id. However, Turner did agree to put the informant in contact with his supplier.
182. Id. at 343. The court noted that it was not bound by the United State's Supreme Court's
holdings regarding entrapment law. Id. at 341. In reaching its decision, the court quoted
extensively from Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Russell. Id. at 341-42.
183. Id. at 342.
184. Id. at 343.
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defendant even after the first investigation failed to produce evidence,
the creation of the addicted girlfriend, and the lack of pre-
investigation evidence linking the defendant to narcotics activity.185
C. Criticisms
There are strong arguments on each side of the subjective-
objective debate. The division turns on a fundamental policy
disagreement: whether the goal of entrapment is to protect the
innocent defendant or to preserve the integrity of law enforcement
and government.
There are three main criticisms of the subjective approach.
186
First, opponents argue that the legislative intent rationale is a fallacy.
They reason that Congress intended to criminalize all illegal conduct,
regardless of the source of inducement. They note that abundant case
law demonstrates that the same conduct is criminal if the inducement
came from a private person (rather than a government agent).197 Since
lack of predisposition alone will not sustain an entrapment defense,
the public policy of deterring unlawful police conduct and preserving
the integrity of law enforcement must be the controlling goal. l s
Proponents of the subjective test counter this argument by citing
Congress' continued silence on the "legislative intent" rationale as an
indication of its validity."s
The second complaint is that standards for police conduct should
not depend on a particular defendant's predisposition. 190 Critics argue
that this approach creates a "who cares" rule for use against persons
who can be shown to be predisposed to engage in criminal conduct by
their prior convictions or bad acts19 Thus, no amount of police deceit
or other unseemly conduct will be considered to be impermissible.' 2
185. Id.
186. Bennett, supra note 81, at 864; see also Feeney, supra note 86, at 1036-37 (citing WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 5.2(c), at 251-52 (1985 & Supp. 1992)).
187. Bennett, supra note 81, at 864 n.284 (citing United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321, 1340
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983)); see also Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169,
175-76 (5th Cir. 1956)(citing authorities supporting private citizen distinction); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 442-43 (1973)(Stewart, J., dissenting)(arguing entrapment focus should be
police conduct since defendant who violated statute was not "innocent").
188. Id.
189. Feeney, supra note 86, at 1062 n.56 (quoting Park, supra note 113, at 247).
190. Bennett, supra note 81, at 864.
191. Id.
192. Duke, supra note 80, at 30. Critics argue that this creates the potential for the police to
decide who will be the criminals. Id. The response to such criticism is that "the trier of fact hears
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Additionally, the subjective approach makes what some regard as an
artificial distinction between innocent, law-abiding citizens and
criminals.193 As the Supreme Court has recognized, it is possible for
,people to have a proclivity for criminal activity but not be predisposed;
to have immoral desires but not to act on them because they are
deterred by fear of the law.194
This criticism is based on two goals of law enforcement. First,
entrapment law should promote police practices which recognize that
individuals are entitled to a presumption of innocence.' Second, the
law should also promote the efficient allocation of police resources.,,
The concern here is whether it is desirable for law enforcement
agencies to exhaust time and energy tempting morality, especially
when years are spent targeting one individual or engaging in "fishing
expeditions" based on a generalized suspicion.197 Supporters of the
subjective test claim that the police are justified in using more
deceptive practices against "criminal" suspects, noting that individuals
cannot always be definitively classified.
Finally, some complain that the predisposition element results in
an evidentiary "free for all" which unfairly biases the defendant in the
eyes of the jury.19 Prior criminal convictions, similar crimes, similar
bad acts, and reputation evidence are permitted into evidence in the
name of rebutting an entrapment defense.199 Supporters of the
subjective approach respond that the remedy lies in stricter
evidence on the government's inducement or encouragement and does not decide the issue of
predisposition in a vacuum." Bennett, supra note 81, at 865.
193. Duke, supra note 80, at 30.
194. Id. By offering suspects "opportunit[ies] which would not exist in the real crime world,"
critics argue that deceptive police practices may snare individuals who would not ordinarily act
because of fear of the law. Id. They claim that such deceptive police practices push individuals'
morality. Thus, the subjective approach allows police to prey on the moral weaknesses of
particular defendants. Id. Further, the immoral nature of some defendants' "proclivities" creates
the potential for jury bias. Id. Online pornography stings create the possibility of such a
problematic entrapment situation. See infra Part IV.A.1.
195. Duke, supra note 80, at 30.
196. Id. (arguing "[p]ersons who commit crimes due to unusual situational pressures,
unselfish motives, or extremely attractive, unreal inducements are neither as dangerous nor as
morally culpable as common criminals.").
197. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1090-91 n.163, 164 (quoting United States v. Kaminski, 703
F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983)(Posner, J., concurring)).
198. Bennett, supra note 81, at 865.
199. Id.
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enforcement of evidence laws, not in eliminating the predisposition
prong.3m
Compared to the subjective test, there are two perceived
advantages of the objective so-called "police conduct" test.' First, it
makes evidence of a particular defendant's "prior crimes and bad
reputation immaterial."' Second, "it permits the development of per
se rules prohibiting certain kinds of practices, and thus providing
guidance to the police."m
There are four chief criticisms of the objective test. The first is
that this standard is too rigid and severely undermines the efforts of
law enforcement. 0 Critics argue that police officers should be entitled
to consider a particular suspect's prior crimes in determining
appropriate methods to use against him.2
A second problem with the objective test is that it is based on a
"hypothetical law abiding citizen;" a false premise in the real world of
criminal conduct where "hypothetical" people, as that term is used, do
not exist.' Critics argue that the test is overly restrictive because it
does not allow police methods to be examined in light of a particular
defendant's weakness of will or vulnerability which a normal law
abiding person would not necessarily possess. 7 This allegedly allows
law enforcment to take advantage of situational motives, and means
that only inducements which are extremely excessive will trigger the
defense. Further, some argue the mechanical nature of a truly
objective test creates the risk of acquitting clever criminals who may
be able to manipulate police conduct to an arguably excessive level.2
200. Id. ("[E]specially Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence which provides that
relevant evidence may be excluded if it is unfairly prejudicial to the defendant . . . also [it
seems] to prohibit the government from using hearsay evidence, character evidence, and
dissimilar bad act evidence to prove predisposition.")(citing Park, supra note 113, at 248 (arguing
"there is nothing special about predisposition that requires the use of otherwise inadmissable
hearsay")).
201. Duke, supra note 80, at 31.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Bennet, supra note 81, at 865-67; see also Feeney, supra note 86, at 104547.
205. Duke, supra note 80, at 31 (arguing methods acceptable for use against a "known drug
dealer" might not be against someone else); see also Feeney, supra note 86, at 1046 n.136.
206. Bennett, supra note 81, at 865-66.
207. Feeney, supra note 86, at 1046 n.136.
208. Duke, supra note 80, at 34.
209. Feeney, supra note 86, at 1046 n.135; see also Bennett, supra note 81, at 866 ("[The




A third criticism of the objective approach is that it leads to
inaccuracy in the fact finding process.210 The nature of the inducement
offered by the police is arguably a factual issue less susceptible to
reliability than evidence of the defendant's predisposition. Opponents
fear that this will result in "swearing matches."'
Finally, critics argue that if the objective test were widely adopted
it would be unlikely to result in any meaningful restrictions on police
conduct.2 2 In support of this prediction, commentators note that the
courts have, based on separation of powers grounds, historically been
reluctant to establish per se rules for undercover investigations.
213
IV
Potential Application of Existing Entrapment Law
to Child Porn Stings in Cyberspace
Defining the proper standards for predisposition and inducement
are the pivotal procedural issues in existing entrapment law. As a
novel setting for undercover investigations, cyberspace214 presents a
new set of difficulties for applying existing standards. The traditional
criticisms of both entrapment tests become more acute in this setting.
This section discusses the practical aspects of applying existing
entrapment standards to cyberspace defendants, and illustrates the
problems with continued reliance on existing doctrine as a meaningful
limit on police deception in cyberspace.
A. Predisposition in Cyberspace
1. Legal Standards
Identifying what factors should be used to establish predisposition
in cyberspace is an important threshhold issue. The analysis which
210. Bennett, supra note 81, at 866.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. This reluctance is based on a separation of powers theory that such judicial rules
would intrude on law enforcement's ability to do its job. Id.; see Feeney, supra note 86, 1036 n.66
(quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973)). See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435,449-50 (1932).
214. See supra Part II.
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follows considers whether the factors currently used to assess
predisposition should be weighed differently in this context.'
5
Under Jacobson, police must show what effectively amounts to a
"reasonable suspicion" standard for targeting a particular user.26 The
difficulty lies in establishing that a particular defendant was
predisposed to solicit sex from a minor just from the typed
conversational exchanges in cyberspace, where users can remain
anonymous, identity is disguisable, and roleplaying may take place. 2 7
Police claim they target suspects only after receiving complaints from
another user or from a commercial or amateur system operator.2 8 The
courts will need to decide whether such complaints are sufficient
evidence of predisposition to target an individual either by
approaching the user with an undercover agent, or requesting the
user's identity from the service provider or sysop.219
The absence of a baseline standard for defining predisposition in
the cyberspace context is also problematic. The chief difficulty is how
to factor the inherent propensity for "big talk" by users in the fantasy-
like atmosphere of the Internet, into a predisposition analysis.=
Caught up in the free-flowing atmosphere of the medium, individuals
are prone to "say" things they might not say elsewhere because of the
anonymity and the false intimacy of cyberspace interactions.
221
Although agents may record such online conversations as evidence of
predisposition to exchange illegal materials or solicit sex from minors,
it seems inherently unclear whether these individuals were
predisposed merely to engage in "big talk" or would really have taken
action independent of the government's involvement.'
215. See supra text accompanying note 158 (describing standards regarding predisposition
enumerated in United States v. Dion, 726 F.2d 673, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 476 U.S.
734 (1986)).
216. Harrison, supra note 6, at 1095-96.
217. See supra Part II.B.
218. Quinn, supra note 1. If the Communications Decency Act is upheld, arguably evidence
of "indecent" entries by the user prior to being approached by the government might constitute
evidence of predisposition to commit the "crime" of online indecency. Cf. Keane, supra note 35.
219. Presumably, in the absence of any inducement on the agent's part, if the suspect
propositions the undercover agent to trade sexually explicit material or to meet, the
predisposition requirement would be satisfied.
220. See supra Part II.B.
221. See id.
222. As previously noted, if the validity of the CDA is upheld, presumably such "big talk"
would be a crime in and of itself and thus would satisfy the predisposition requirement.
1996]
Determining at what point legal online "speech" becomes
unlawful is a related problem. The Supreme Court has recognized that
lawful conduct cannot be used to show that the suspect was
predisposed to break the law. For example, consider the situation
where a suspected pedophile is engaging in "racy" but lawful speech
and is approached by an undercover agent using a suggestive user
name and profile. The agent makes "indecent" (illegal under the
CDA) comments which induce the user to respond in kind, with the
exchange ultimately culminating in a request for illegal material.
Under Jacobson, it would be circular reasoning to say the suspect's
subsequent conduct amounted to evidence of predisposition.'
Predisposition is not established where a defendant has
committed a crime in response to being offered an opportunity by law
enforcement agents; an opportunity which would not exist in the "real
world." Such a defendant was "ready and willing to commit the crime,
just waiting for the opportunity," independent of law enforcment
involvement.2  The repeated inducements of online undercover
agents posing as teens using suggestive user names presents such an
"unartificial" situation. As in Jacobson, this type of inducement is an
example of law enforcment challenging an individual's morality. Such
conduct violates the unifying aim of both the subjective and objective
approaches to limit undercover techniques which unproductively
create crime. 226
2. Evidentiary Issues
Evidence collection problems arise in all stages of the online
investigation: pre-contact, during contact, and following contact with
the suspect. Establishing that the accused was predisposed prior to
being approached by law enforcement creates a "chicken-egg"
dilemma. Although the real-world predisposition factors could be
used,' other issues arising in cyberspace make the practical
application of these elements difficult. For example, in order to obtain
user identities from the service provider under existing law, the police
223. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 551 (1992).
224. Feeney, supra note 86, at 1053-54 (citing Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550-54). A discussion of
obscenity (and indecency) standards is beyond the scope of this Note.
225. Duke, supra note 80, at 32.
226. Id.
227. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1985); rev'd in part, 476 U.S. 734
(1986).
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need a warrant. m Courts will need to determine whether complaints
from users about specific chat rooms or other users are sufficient to
satisfy the probable cause requirement for a warrant.' Once the
police obtain the user's identity, they can do a "real world"
background check to determine whether the traditional predisposition
factors are present. Thus, in practice, if the agents need more than just
"cybertalk" to show predisposition, they would first have to record the
online exchanges, get the user's identity, and then conduct a
background check. This undermines the requirement that the
goverment must have a reasonable suspicion prior to targeting a
particular individual.' Under existing law, the police have the
incentive to first "troll," then to collect evidence, and lastly, as an
afterthought, to do background checks in order to gather
predisposition evidence. This infringes on the privacy interests of law-
abiding citizens.
3. Privacy Issues
Privacy issues are implicated in establishing predisposition in this
context. Under the ECPA, bulletin board operators, FTP site owners,
and service providers have no duty to police their sites, and have a
duty not to divulge a subscriber's identity unless criminal activity is
suspected."' Nevertheless, some commercial services monitor public
areas. However, it is impractical for a sysop or site owner to monitor
every public exchange, and sysops cannot patrol private areas such as
e-mail or private chat rooms.' Additionally, because the size of
networks managed by sysops vary, it is economically infeasible to hold
an amateur BBS to the same requirements as a commercial system.
E-mail messages and other online communications can be
retrieved, saved, and thereby used as evidence of predisposition.234 In
the context of pedophile computer sting operations, the suspect's
online attempts to arrange meetings with minors could be collected by
228. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1100-01. As a practical matter, this may be impossible on
smaller BBSs where sysops do not require users to identify themselves, or if the user is operating
through an anonymous server or remailer.
229. Apparently this was enough to allow the September 1995 sting to proceed. See Quinn,
supra note 1 (describing police monitoring of e-mail and private lines based on complaints from
other users). These cases have not yet played out in court.
230. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553.
231. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1100-01.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1102.
234. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1085-88.
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law enforcement. This retrieval of personal communications raises
invasion of privacy concerns.
4. Community Standards
Under the subjective approach to entrapment, predisposition is a
jury question which implicates issues of community standards.
Because of the distasteful nature of child pornography distribution
and related online offenses, the potential for jury bias is great. The
question is which standards should govern: those of the "real world"
community where the information is received or those of the
"cybercommunity" where the interactions occur?m If a defendant is
entitled to a jury of his peers, arguably a BBS or chatroom constitutes
such a peer group or "cybercommunity." In the context of such a
"community," the communication between suspected pedophiles
(which some argue should qualify as predisposition) could be viewed
as merely "big talk," boasting, or fantasizing of having sex with a
minor.' Users who frequent the forum are likely to be more willing
than "real world" juries to recognize the distinction between
predisposition to act and predisposition to talk suggestively with a
minor.
Additionally, the law may need to recognize the potential
therapeutic value in allowing pedophiles to talk out their fantasies
online.m While their fantasies may be morally repugnant by some
standards, fantasies alone are not criminal. As noted above, a person
may not be predisposed to act and still be induced to commit the crime
if the opportunity presented by law enforcement is unusually
235. See William Byasee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the
Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197, 204-07, 218-19 (Spring 1995)(considering
United States v. Thomas, No. CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. 1994)(holding that case should be
tried under community standards of state where material was received in first online
pornography case involving venue)).
236. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1104. This is especially true in the context of a newsgroup or
bulletin board devoted to a particular topic where members communicate with a particular
common understanding regarding the nature and tenor of their conversation. Byassee, supra note
235, at 203, 218-19.
237. See id. at 209-10.
238. It has been suggested that this behavior serves an important release valve function and
would-be pedophiles could use cyberspace as a support group forum. Arguably, not all people
who talk about pedophilia necessarily commit such acts. See Bates, supra note 15, at 10.
However, sex experts make a compelling counter-argument that such online exchanges
normalize and reinforce this undesirable behavior. Further, it may solidify the desire to act out; it
creates group solidarity and conspiracies, and facilitates crime by enabling pedophiles to assist
each other in locating willing victims. Id.
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attractive.239 Thus, an online suspect could have the proclivity toward
the behavior and still not be predisposed.'
B. Police Inducement Standards
241
1. Sliding Scale of Deception
In the context of the anonymity of cyberspace, determining a
standard for acceptable levels of police deception raises a number of
issues. This section examines what type of conduct should be
permitted in terms of the deception used to gain access to private
areas on the Internet, and the deception once the agent is online.
Specifically, this section will address whether these standards should
differ depending on the level of access.
As this new area of investigation develops, certain procedural
norms and techniques are beginning to emerge. In the September
1995 sting, law enforcement agents signed on to AOL with warrants
and the sysops knowledge. Police also used informants to obtain
passwords to coded bulletin boards and to learn of unlisted sites.'
Once online, agents engaged in "mirroring"-creating a suggestive
user profile that attempts to match either what the target is doing or
what he is ostensibly seeking to find. Under current law, police appear
to have unbridled discretion to employ whatever means necessary for
bait.2
In this context, the inducement standards need to recognize the
varying degrees of deception allowed by the unique qualities of
cyberspace; e.g., there is a distinction between pretending to be a
thirteen year old girl and pretending to be an adult interested in child
pornography. In the "real world," an agent would not have the
freedom to engage in the former category of conduct. This raises a
concern that such deception may be too egregious. Additionally, at
least one legal scholar has noted that this type of police roleplaying
creates the potential for scenarios where the police are chasing
239. Duke, supra note 80, at 32; see also supra Part III.C.
240. Duke, supra note 80, at 32.
241. Because inducement raises a set of concerns which differ from those pertaining to
predisposition, the issues relating to inducement standards will be analyzed under a different
analytical framework.
242. Selcraig, supra note 4, at 47.
243. Selcraig, supra note 4, at 47-48 ("If he weren't such a good cop he'd be a pervert;"
questioning whether cyberspace stings are a wise allocation of police resources).
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themselves. However, supporters argue that the nature of the forum
and the offensiveness of the crime justify the use of more aggressively
deceptive tactics.m
2. Privacy Expectations
The level of access at which the conduct occurs should be
considered in determining what level of deception is permissible.'
Arguably, a user on a subscriber service would expect that only other
subscribers are privy to the communication, whereas an unlisted
bulletin board or those areas which require a password would have a
greater expectation of privacy. Furthermore, there would be an even
greater expectation of privacy with respect to private chat lines and e-
mail. Thus, it would seem appropriate for entrapment law to consider
the level of access as a factor in the inducement analysis.
3. Efficient Allocation of Police Resources
A third issue is whether law enforcement is justified in engaging
in crime in the name of crime prevention. The creation of phony BBSs
devoted to child porn talk, and the planting of illegal graphic material
on FTP sites, raises government overinvolvement issues.'
Entrapment law also needs to address whether police violate suspects'
due process rights when they pose as suggestive-talking teens, i.e.,
crossing the line from detection into the realm of outrageous
conduct.3
244. Alan Dershowitz, Federally Felonious Felonies, PENTHOUSE, Feb. 1996, at 50.
245. See generally John Scheller, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy and Child
Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 989 (1994). Supporters of a vigorous approach to
prosecuting and preventing online child pornography and related crime argue that existing law
should continue to be applied, giving agents a free reign to tailor undercover practices as they see
fit. Proponents claim this approach is justified by the extreme threat posed by the facilitation of
crime on the Internet. As such, law enforcement should be given even greater leeway to
determine in which type of deception they may engage. Id.
246. For further discussion of the differing levels of privacy expectation in the various areas
of cyberspace, see Larry Downes, Electronic Communications and the Plain View Exception:
More Bad Physics, 7 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 239, 273 (1994)(discussing whether BBSs are public
forums).
247. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 454, 490 (stating remedy for overinvolvement
lies in punishing police officer under state law).
248. If the CDA is upheld by the courts, online officers may have to be more circumscribed
in their racy talk or tread into the realm of illegal speech. However, as indicated above, the CDA
is not likely to affect the ability of police to engage in such aggressive deception. See generally
Keane, supra note 35.
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Such practices arguably push individual morality, and the existing
subjective approach to entrapment allows police to prey upon the
sexual proclivities of particular defendants. 2 Consider the suspected
online pedophile who has a "situational" motive but refrains from
acting upon it through self-restraint. He has the proclivity to act but is
not predisposed to commit the crime of soliciting sex from minors
because a fear of the law enables him to hold his impulses in check.
All he desires is to engage in online fantasies. However, if tempted
over a long period of time by undercover agents posing as suggestive-
talking teens, the individual will succumb because of the special
temptation factor. Again this undermines the "ready and willing"
standard for predisposition. Arguably, the ordinary law-abiding
citizen, lacking the situational motive, would never resort to
requesting child pornography or soliciting sex from a minor, no matter
how egregious the police conduct. However, it may not be productive
for law enforcement to spend time and resources creating crime




One of the main justifications for using undercover investigations
to detect and prevent crime is that there are no other viable methods
to accomplish these goals." If the purpose of these computer stings is
to protect children, there are some alternatives for crime prevention
which might be equally effective without infringing on users' rights
and the chilling effect on online communications.
A. Private/Non-legislative Solutions
1. Parental Supervision
Ideally, parents should take responsibility for monitoring their
children's activities in cyberspace. Parents can block access to certain
249. See supra notes 119-132. Another concern is that by posing as sex-savvy underage
victims police are providing negative role models for "real" minors.
250. See Duke, supra note 80, at 32; see also Harrison, supra note 6, at 1090-91 (citing United
States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983)(Posner, J., concurring)).
251. Bennett, supra note 81, at 831.
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areas by using currently available computer software blocking
technology.252
However, most parents are not nearly as familiar with the
technology as their children and many parents feel intimidated.3 Yet
this solution does not require parents to have superior Internet
knowledge. Parents must take the time to establish rules for their
children's Internet use or, preferably, accompany their children online,
having their kids explain the process to them.254
2. User Awareness
Another proposed solution to online crime prevention is to
encourage increased self-regulation by users. Users could institute
more cybercommunity "neighborhood watch programs" to raise
awareness. Such programs would promote reporting suspected online
pedophiles to service providers or sysops who can then block the
offending user's access or report the user to the police.
"Cyberangels" are an example of one self-designated group of users
who patrol cyberspace. However, self-regulation raises concerns such
as the promotion of cybercommunity violence, vigilantism, and system
operator liablity.2
3. Sysop Censorship/Monitoring
Sysops on commercial systems already engage in censorship and
monitor the cybercommunity.5 AOL and CompuServe currently use
a scanning device to censor online communications; this is problematic
because it screens "forbidden" words used in a benign context.2
252. While earlier technology was problematic because it blocked usage for all members of
the household, the new software allows adults to gain access to certain blocked areas by using a
password. See generally Johnathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
(forthcoming Winter 1997).
253. Pedicini, supra note 16, at B1.
254. Commercial services have joined together to issue safety guidelines and promote parent
awareness. Torres, supra note 9, at 3. Advocates of parental supervision as a solution suggest
parents should treat cyberspace like a big city and not let their children wander around
unaccompanied. Id.
255. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1111-12. Some commercial systems also already have
monitors in place who users can call to warn of offenders and then block access. Id.
256. Byassee, supra note 235, at 216-18.
257. Id.; see also Goldman, supra note 35, at 1111.
258. Goldman, supra note 35, at 1111 ("breast" support group example). This approach has
the potential to miss online seducers who use non-sexually overt language, but which is
nevertheless sexually suggestive.
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Advocates of the self-censorship approach argue that the Internet
is a free market and subscribers can switch at will to whichever system
provides access to groups of their choice. Additionally, new bulletin
boards are easy to create and quickly spring up.' Thus, supporters




Legislating sysop policing and monitoring by holding the service
provider liable for online crimes is another proposed solution. The
potential problem with sysop liability is that it would force commercial
systems and others to take additional precautions, thereby increasing
the cost of access. This would severly impinge on one of the most
attractive qualities of the Internet-the ease of setting up a bulletin
board system. °
2. Criminal Penalties
Another proposed alternative is to restrict access to the Internet
as a condition of parole for convicted offenders?6 1 However, this
would require service providers to conduct a background check on
prospective users and would impose a prohibitive burden on service
providers and sysops who do not charge a fee for access.
3. Police Procedure Legislation
In the absence of alternative workable solutions, police will use
deceptive undercover techniques to detect and prevent crime in
cyberspace. Therefore, new guidelines are needed for limiting such
practices in this unique context. Existing case law and statutes which
codify the judicially created entrapment doctrine do not adequately
address the new potential for police abuse of deception in
cyberspace.26 Because the law should not linger at the pace of judicial
259. Id.
260. Seegenrallyid. at 1114-15.
261. See, e.g., Laura Davis, et al., Controlling Computer Access to Pornography: Special
Conditions for Sex Offenders, 59 FED. PROBATION 43 (June 1995).
262. Mark Eckenweiler, Criminal Law and the Internet, AMER. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1993, at
S32. Commentators have argued that existing laws cannot be stretched to fit the contours of
cyberspace in a variety of legal contexts, including obscenity and copyright infringement.
Byassee, supra note 235, at 207.
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interpretation while technology rapidly progresses, Congress must
take a proactive stance in dealing with cyberspace entrapment issues.
Legislation has already been passed creating penalties for online child
pornography distribution and related crimes. Legislatures must also
develop guidelines for online police procedures.
For example, legislative guidelines could place a higher burden of
proof on the prosecution for establishing the elements of online
offenses. Once a defendant raises an entrapment defense, the
prosecution would need to show (1) the defendant's predisposition
and (2) the police conduct was reasonable. The reasonableness
analysis would take into account the police techniques in the
cyberspace context; e.g., applying a sliding scale of deception
depending on the level of access. New evidentiary guidelines would be
the best way to handle the predisposition issue, including a new
definition of what predisposition means in the cyberspace context.
VI
Conclusion
If the goal of cyberspace regulation is to protect minors and not
paternalistically protect society as a whole, then the outlined proposals
may be adequate. However, accepting the reality that law enforcement
will use these innovative methods to catch innovative criminals,
entrapment law must face the reality of cyberspace. Existing doctrine
fails to address concerns of potential online abuse.
The uniqueness of the Internet, which some have called a hybrid
of other communication mediums, means that existing doctrine should
not be stretched. As illustrated, this is true for the entrapment defense
in that it does not adequately address concerns of potential police
abuse in cyberspace. Different settings for undercover operations
merit different levels of protection. The law surrounding the First
Amendment makes this distinction, allowing courts to accord different
levels of protection to speech based on distinct characteristics of
various communications mediums.' To be an effective limit on police
deception in this setting, entrapment law must similarly take into
account the special features of this new forum for criminal activity.
263. Such an approach might use existing law in states which combine the
subjective/objective approach as a starting point for developing statutory language. See supra
note 173 (citing statutes); see also Bennett, supra note 81, at 35 n.38.
264. See Note, The Message is the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1062 (1994)(citing Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
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Thus, new legislation should redefine the parameters of judicially
created law as applied in cyberspace. Laws are needed to regulate the
allocation of police resources and the standards for establishing
predisposition. Furthermore, new rules are needed for evidence
collection which take into account the different levels of access in
cyberspace.
While recent attempts at cyberspace regulation have focused on
punishing criminals, there is an equivalent need to regulate police
conduct in this area of law enforcement. Specifically, regulations must
establish a context specific "reasonableness" analysis for evaluating
acceptable police practices. Although the Supreme Court has
supported an entrapment test which focuses on prediposition,
entrapment law as applied to cyberspace should give considerable
scrutiny to police conduct. This shift is justified by the increased
propensity for the abuse of deceptive practices and the reality that
proof of predisposition is more problematic in this new
communications medium.
The attraction of cyberspace is the free exchange of ideas. The
presence of undercover police inhibit and chill this exchange. To allow
law enforcement to continue to conduct undercover operations in
cyberspace would compromise the potential freedom of unlimited
communication offered by this unique forum.
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